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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

November 16, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

W. R. SMYSEN

SUBJECT:

An Interesting Analysis of U.S. -Japan
History

25X6

Attached are two documents that I recommend for background reading on Japan:

-- The first (at Tab A) is a study of U.S. -Japan relations, done by a young professor at Southern Illinois University, Eugene Trani. Reviewing the history of those relations between 1898 and 1941, Dr. Trani concludes that the U.S. changed its demands of Japan periodically and that the Japanese were able to accommodate to American demands three times but not the fourth. The fourth led to war.

25X6

Very interesting
- especially Tab A

~~SECRET~~ XGDS 5B (1), (2), (3)

Four American Fiddlers and Their Far Eastern Tunes:
A Survey of Japanese-American Relations, 1898-1941

Eugene P. Trani

Southern Illinois University

and

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Any survey of Japanese-American relations between 1898 and 1941 must be just that -- a survey. The subject is too broad, too complex, too significant to lend itself to a neat thirty-page package.¹ Many issues crowd the interaction between the two major non-European powers that came to maturity during that period. Territorial acquisitions, immigration, the power balance in Asia, naval rivalry, China, economic competition, and other issues -- all stand in the way of generalization about the period.

Yet some comments can be made. The forty-three years from 1898 to 1941 can be discussed in a variety of ways, and one of the most interesting and important is to go beyond the events of interaction, whether formal diplomacy or informal contact, and look to the roles of the United States and Japan. How did the United States view Japan? What role did the United States see for itself in the Pacific and what role for Japan? Did these roles change? These questions, of course, introduce others. What about the Japanese and their roles? But emphasis here will be on the United States and the roles it defined, as expressed by four major American statesmen of the period.

To approach this topic in terms of roles poses difficulties. The distinction between government and people is perhaps most obvious. Sometimes government leaders hold certain beliefs about American behavior in East Asia, with which the people, or at least some of them, disagree. There have been disputes within the government, between the president and officials in the State Department, the Departments of the Navy and Army and other agencies, about the Far East. And events sometimes outrun plans, and a

course of action can take place irrespective of and even in opposition to the roles a government has set up. Yet between 1898 and 1941 there were generally accepted views in America of the roles for the United States and Japan. It is to these roles that this essay is directed.

The period of increasing conflict of the United States and Japan, between 1898 and 1941, breaks into four divisions, each approximately a decade long and each with different American roles.² In each division a major figure stands out as spokesman for the role of the moment. The first division, from 1898 to 1909, was dominated by Theodore Roosevelt. The United States looked at Japan with a mixture of admiration and suspicion. Here the tune Roosevelt played for Japanese listeners was "Expand to the Mainland." The second division was from 1909 to 1920. In that decade the United States viewed Japan as a modern imperial power. It changed the role it perceived for itself, and that it perceived for Japan, with a growing belief in the need to help China, which country it saw as the hope of the future in East Asia. The significance of that eleven-year period in Japanese-American relations is only now beginning to be understood. The tune of the decade, played most frequently by President Woodrow Wilson, was "Imperialism Is Over." The third division, from 1920 to 1931, was a period of calm in relations as each country changed to peacetime economies, concentrated on economics, and worked to consolidate the gains of World War I. The United States accepted Japan as a major power in the Pacific. Here the tune was "International Cooperation," and the principal musician was Charles Evans Hughes. The last division, from 1931 to 1941, has often been referred

to as a decade of hostility, and Japan appeared an aggressor nation. While war was perhaps not inevitable, strikingly absent from this decade was any "significant disposition toward peaceful solutions."³ The American tune of the decade, played by Henry L. Stimson, was "Stop the Aggression." What is most interesting about these different American tunes and the roles they ascribed is that the Japanese, after much difficulty and with many reservations, danced to the first three tunes but decided to play their own in the 1930s.

Some specific comments about each division and its spokesman are in order. By the end of 1898 the United States and Japan stood as powers with not merely major interests in East Asia but with major points of disagreement. Their relations up until that year had been generally good. It was the United States, through Commodore Matthew C. Perry, that opened Japan in 1853. Interchanges for the next thirty-five years were cordial as Japan worked to build up strength to protect itself from the West. As Japan modernized, trade with the United States benefited both countries. Americans went to Japan to preach technology, Christianity and democracy, while Japanese came to the United States to trade and study. The United States Naval Academy's graduating class of 1881 symbolized the spirit of Japanese-American relations in the last half of the 19th century. Among the three Japanese graduates was Uryu Sotokichi, later one of the naval heroes of the Russo-Japanese War. The American graduates included John W. Weeks, later senator from Massachusetts and Warren G. Harding's secretary of war, and Ovington E. Weller who was to serve as senator from Maryland.⁴

Americans looked with admiration as the Japanese quickly mastered much Western technology, treated American visitors with kindness, and adopted a more democratic form of government. There were moments of controversy and issues of contention but generally Japan was viewed as a country that was progressive and increasingly democratic, following in the footsteps of the United States.

Feeling began to change at the end of the century, particularly with the successful conclusion of wars by each nation, the Sino-Japanese War which ended in 1895, and the Spanish-American War of 1898. Before that time the interests of the United States in East Asia were limited. Trade was important, and there were missionaries in much of Asia. America had territorial outposts in or touching the Pacific: California, Alaska, interest in Samoa. But Washington had no real Far Eastern policy. With 1898 and annexation of Hawaii and then the acquisition of Guam and the Philippines as a result of the war, the government was forced to think seriously about the Far East. Japan, fresh from a smashing victory over China, loomed large on the diplomatic horizon. The Sino-Japanese and Spanish-American Wars marked the real emergence of the victors as expansionist powers in East Asia.⁵ From that point on, a collision of the interests of the United States and Japan, though not necessarily in war, was nearly inevitable.

Events of the years from 1898 to 1909, so important in Japanese-American relations, can best be understood by following the reaction of one American, Theodore Roosevelt. While the majority of Americans thought little about contacts with Japan, TR was representative of many who did.

He was an expansionist and supported the American movement into world affairs as the 19th century came to a close. For a variety of reasons he believed expansion necessary for the advancement of the United States, with benefits resulting for the rest of the world. He viewed world affairs in strategic relations and felt a keen affinity for Great Britain. During his pre-presidential years he called for the annexation of Hawaii, served in the war against Spain, favored keeping Guam and the Philippines, supported the Open Door Notes, and argued the case for a large navy.

As the 20th century began, and Britain was in obvious decline as a world power, Roosevelt believed the United States had a large role in the Far Eastern picture and sought to define the position of both the United States and Japan in East Asia. Throughout his public life he was torn between admiration for Japanese efficiency and fighting qualities and concern about their military strength. While he had expressed irritation at Japan's protest against possible American annexation of Hawaii in 1897, and had worried about the Philippine Islands after 1898, by the time he became president in 1901 admiration had overcome fear. He supported Japan's new position of prominence in East Asia. He decided that Japan did not threaten important American interests. He saw the Japanese as a barrier to Russian expansion, as a preserver of the balance of power in East Asia, as a protector of the open door, and as a potential stabilizer of China, a nation for which he had little respect. He supported the Anglo-Japanese alliance, concluded in 1902. He understood the necessity of avoiding war to protect American East Asian interests, especially on the Chinese mainland. The American people simply

would not support such a war, and TR thought with good reason, as even the successful conclusion of such a war would not guarantee American interests there.⁶

Roosevelt had set up roles for the United States and Japan. While the American government had commercial and naval interests in the Far East, it had limited power. Japanese interests, especially on the mainland, seemed not to conflict with those of the United States. While Japan and the United States were potential naval and commercial rivals, they should work together. It was with that view that Roosevelt supported Japan in its war with Russia in 1904-1905 which ended with a peace treaty signed at the Portsmouth Navy Yard, just miles from this present conference.⁷ To be sure, Roosevelt was aware of the possibility of Japan's getting "puffed with pride," should the Japanese decisively defeat the Russians. He hoped that Japan would not threaten American interests in China, if victorious. But he recognized that Japan would have special interests on the Asian mainland, and supported the Japanese claim to Korea. At one point he even talked about a Japanese Monroe Doctrine in the Far East. TR hoped to arrange a balanced antagonism between Russia and Japan after the war.

That outcome proved impossible. Japan's defeat of Russia was so decisive and other events intervening in Japanese-American relations so important that TR had a change of heart as to the Japanese role in East Asia. At that point he began to play for the Japanese a special tune, "Expand to the Mainland." After 1905, Japan moved to close the door in Manchuria and the Sino-Japanese rivalry intensified. Roosevelt's mind was elsewhere.

Not only were there problems in Europe, but even in the Far East the whole relationship between the United States and Japan changed, at least in his mind. He became more concerned about possessions in the Far East, referring to the Philippines in 1907 as the United States's "heel of Achilles," and became alarmed over an immigration crisis between the two countries.⁸ He saw that Japan could expand either to the west or east, and hoped to trade off an increased Japanese presence in China for guarantees of the security of American possessions in the Pacific and a solution to the immigration crisis. The period from 1905 to 1909 was difficult for him, given Japanese disappointment over the Portsmouth peace, the continuing immigration issue, a real war scare, and naval expansion. There was continued Japanese expansion in East Asia but TR saw such a course as natural.

The most important part about the President's view of the new situation was his belief that the open door in China was not worth war with Japan. He believed that the United States should do what it could to preserve its interests in China. But it should recognize Japan as the dominant power on the Asian mainland. In short, he gave a green light to Japanese expansion in Manchuria. One of the best expressions of this belief appeared in a letter to Secretary of State-designate Philander C. Knox on February 8, 1909, shortly before leaving office.⁹ He noted that Japanese-American relations were of "great and permanent importance." While Japanese immigration to the United States had to stop, the Washington government should "show all possible courtesy and consideration." The Taft administration had to understand that "Japan is vitally interested in China and on the Asiatic mainland

and her wiser statesmen will if possible prevent her getting entangled in a war with us, because whatever its result it would hamper and possibly ruin Japan when she came to deal again with affairs in China." Since the Pacific Coast of the United States was defenseless and "we have no army to hold or reconquer the Philippines and Hawaii," the United States had to avoid war. TR felt that China and American interests in that country were insignificant in the broader context of America's Far Eastern policy. Consider how different things might have been, had such a philosophy been at work during the 1930s.

It is interesting that the Japanese after long discussion and with reluctance, for they wanted to combine peaceful economic expansion to the east with a new presence in China, decided in 1908 to dance to TR's tune and concentrate on continental expansion. They felt that this was a course that would avoid conflict with the United States -- something which had become a concern of military planners in the United States.¹⁰

The years from 1898 to 1909 saw initial controversy in Japanese-American relations. 1898 had begun with the United States a minor power in East Asia, with little involvement in that area. By 1909 all that had changed. Russia was nearly gone from the East Asia equation, smashed by Japan. Britain, France, Germany maintained interests in the Far East, but as the years marched on to 1914 and the grand collision in Europe, these nations took less interest in Asia. Japan and the United States remained and by 1909 both had large stakes in the Far East. During the years from 1898 to 1909 all the major issues of Japanese-American relations

came to the fore. Trade, expansion, naval rivalry, immigration, had all become obvious. But there was no war. The American government, and especially Roosevelt, recognized that Japan had legitimate interests in the Far East and prepared to allow Japan a major role. There was suspicion but there was also respect and even admiration, as Americans looked to Japan.

My distinguished co-panelist, Akira Iriye, has suggested that the years after 1906 mark the beginning of estrangement -- political, diplomatic, ideological, and even psychological -- of the Americans and the Japanese. This is true. But the estrangement became pronounced and in the long run more significant when the United States, in addition to other rivalries with Japan, began to oppose Japanese continental expansion.¹¹ That did not happen until Roosevelt left the White House. The Japanese then discovered that Roosevelt's green light in China had changed to red, and remained so for most of the time until 1941.

The years from 1909 to 1920 were decisive for relations between Japan and America. Events that worsened that relationship crowded those years. American efforts to restore the open door in Manchuria, the continuing immigration crisis, naval expansion, American sympathy for the Chinese Revolution, Washington's reaction to the Twenty-One Demands and the Shantung settlement, Japanese-American contention at Paris, intervention in Siberia, and growth of antagonistic caricatures in many minds within each country of the other, all these made the eleven-year period, at least in my mind, perhaps the most important decade in relations between these countries.

prior to 1941. Relations in 1909 mixed suspicion with respect, but by 1920 had undergone such tension ~~that Japan~~ in the minds of many Americans, had become the expected antagonist in East Asia. The same process was occurring in Japan.

While Woodrow Wilson was the dominant American figure in Japanese-American relations during that period, some comments about the years between TR and Wilson are necessary. Even as the Roosevelt administration came to an end forces were then at work that would reverse TR's policy and change the roles that America saw in East Asia. After 1905 the State Department regained control of diplomacy toward East Asia as Roosevelt turned attention elsewhere. In 1908, Elihu Root established the Department's first geographic unit, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. The new structure provided "an opportunity for policy to move upward from lower bureaucratic levels."¹² While not significant in the last year of TR's administration, the Division even then opposed Japanese expansion into China. Opposition to Japan's China policy eventually dominated the Division and became a most important factor in the years from 1909 to 1941. (Stanley Humberg)

With urging from the bureaucracy and because of a combination of economic and moral motives, the Taft administration changed policy toward East Asia. Power balances became less important. An ability and even willingness to consider specific problems as parts of larger pictures became rarer. The Taft administration was less interested in Europe, and it increased American involvement in Latin America and China. For Japanese-American relations the latter shift had importance. Encouraged by State Department

officials like Francis M. Huntington Wilson and Willard Straight, the Taft administration decided to challenge Japan's newly established preeminence in Manchuria. The Open Door Notes, which had changed in meaning after 1900, assumed importance in Japanese-American relations. The reasons for the change in American policy were complicated. There was need for economic expansion, growing suspicion of and resentment against Japan, and most important a faith in the future and importance of China. In the long run the effort to loosen Japan's grip on Manchuria failed mightily.

Faith in China increased during the Wilson years as the tension rose between Washington and Tokyo. Japan became a rival in China, as well as a military and commercial threat in the Pacific. Wilson approached foreign policy from a different framework than Theodore Roosevelt. He did not look at foreign policy in terms of balance but rather envisioned a new era in which foreign affairs would move from imperialism to a new community of interest. In earlier years Wilson had supported the Spanish-American War and acquisition of territory in the Pacific. In his History of the American People, published in 1902, he wrote that the United States "could not easily have dispensed with that foothold in the East which the possession of the Philippines so unexpectedly afforded them." Still, he favored preparation of the Philippines for self-government. In a lecture at Waterbury, Connecticut in December, 1900, he warned the American people not to expect the Philippines to adopt "an American form of government."¹³ He thought territorial conquest was part of the foreign policy of the past, and from 1913 onward, but especially with the controversy over the Twenty-One Demands,

began to play his tune of "Imperialism Is Over" for the Japanese.

When he entered office he was not anti-Japanese. But he was certainly pro-Chinese. Many writers have made the point that Wilson never exhibited to the Japanese the "same sympathy and tolerance with which he viewed and treated China. Standards of international morality which he held so highly were often waived in judging China but applied rigidly and without insight in dealing with Japan."¹⁴ There are several explanations for this. Wilson judged Japan to be an advanced nation and accountable for its behavior. As early as 1889, the then young professor at Wesleyan University in Connecticut had commented upon Japan's maturity. He had pointed out the similarities between the constitutions of Prussia and Japan and noted: "And I think that, considering the stage of development in which Japan now finds herself, the Prussian constitution was an excellent instrument to copy. Her choice of it as a model is but another proof of the singular sagacity, the singular power to see and learn, which is Japan's best constitution and promise of success."¹⁵ It was perhaps significant that he saw Japan moving in the footsteps of Prussia. It was not so much that Wilson viewed Japan as an Asian nation but as a modern nation, and he became critical of its expansionist tendencies.

Wilson had warm feelings for China. Because of his acquaintance with missionaries, his connection with China through Princeton, and his own thinking, he had great sympathy for China, mixed with a sense of superiority. He had supported Chinese exclusion, writing that American laborers could not compete with the "thrifty, skilful" Chinese, but condemned the wanton

attacks upon Chinese in America. He reacted positively to the Chinese Revolution, seeing the long-suppressed Chinese as a people beginning to come into their own.¹⁶ In the main his Far Eastern policy concerned China, and China became the dominant factor in Japanese-American relations. He indicated his pro-Chinese policy by three moves early in his administration: he withdrew support for a Chinese consortium, believing it an effort to continue imperialism in China; recognized the government of Yuan Shih-k'ai, hoping Yuan would bring stability; and took great care in naming his minister to China, a place where "the interests of China and of the Christian world are so intimately involved."¹⁷ China, to Wilson, had become a nation under siege by imperialist nations, of which Japan was one of the most important. For him, the United States had a mission: to help the Chinese on their path to participation in world affairs.

These considerations led to a change in the American roles for Japan and the United States. The United States added to its role assistance to China to oppose the imperialist nations. This meant a shift in the role for Japan. While Wilson and Americans in general still recognized Japan's large interests on the Asian mainland, gone was the feeling that these interests could operate to the exclusion of Americans and to the injury of Chinese. The years of campaigning by missionaries, merchants interested in the China market, and philosophers of democracy who pictured the Chinese as ready to adopt that form of government and follow in the footsteps of the United States, were beginning to pay off.

Japanese conduct during the World War increased Wilson's pro-

Chinese feelings, and by mid-1915 had made him anti-Japanese. The World War had profound repercussions on Japanese-American relations. By the end of the war, the United States looked to the Pacific with greater concern than the Atlantic. The Japanese had seen the war in Europe as a great opportunity. William L. Neumann has written that "capable and ambitious leaders had learned that the code of international politics permitted one nation's troubles to be another nation's gain."¹⁸

Dissatisfied with peaceful continentalism on the Asian mainland, blocked by the United States from eastward expansion, Japanese officials in 1914 decided to seize the German concessions in China and in the Pacific north of the equator. The controversy over the Twenty-One Demands which followed shortly was highly important in Japanese-American relations, for "from this point onward American support of China's territorial and administrative integrity has been seen as a prime source of tension." Wilson was unwilling to intervene militarily in this controversy, but American diplomatic policy opposed Japan. The United States would not recognize any impairment of what was "commonly known as the open door policy." Burton Beers believes that the United States missed an opportunity, recognized by Robert Lansing, to resolve general Japanese-American problems, but given Wilson's beliefs toward the roles of the United States and Japan in East Asia it is hard to imagine how the differences could have been resolved.¹⁹

In the summer of 1915 the President's attention left the Far East, turning to Europe and his ensuing bid for re-election. The submarine crisis, the Russian Revolution of 1917, entry into the war, and eventually the terms of p

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after 1915 became a secondary consideration. Only in Paris in 1919 did it become a major problem. It is true that the Lansing-Ishii agreements of 1917 reduced some of the tension between the United States and Japan, especially concerning Chinese commerce, but problems remained. Beers properly views this agreement as "a symbol of the triumph of presidential idealism over Secretary Lansing's desire for a realistic Japanese-American accord."²⁰ And there was the Siberian intervention which certainly heightened tension between the two countries, with American mistrust of Japanese intentions in Russia.

But at Paris the East Asian problem exploded.²¹ The Japanese pressed for German rights in Shantung, a paramount position in Eastern Asia, acceptance of wartime treaties with China, a declaration of racial equality, and control of German Islands in the North Pacific. The Japanese failed to get the statement on equality and gained only mandate control, through the League of Nations, of some of the German Islands. The big stake was Shantung and a general solution of the Chinese problem. Wilson's advisers called for return to China of German rights in Shantung, but the Japanese insisted on retaining them. After difficult negotiations, complicated by prior treaties between Japan and France and Great Britain, and a Japanese threat to boycott the treaty and the League, the Japanese won control of German economic rights in Shantung. Wilson opposed the claims, but saw the solution as a compromise -- one final bit of imperialism in hope that the League would bring a new order. His feelings about the compromise were revealed in a letter sent to an American missionary who served in China,

the Reverend Dr. Samuel I. Woodbridge, who had married Wilson's first cousin, Jeanie Woodrow. A frequent correspondent about Chinese matters, Woodbridge criticized the compromise. Obviously stung, Wilson replied:

France and Great Britain absolutely bound themselves by treaty to Japan with regard to the Shantung Settlement as it stands in the Treaty with Germany. What would you propose that we should do? To refuse to concur in the Treaty with Germany would not alter the situation in China's favor, unless it is your idea that we should force Great Britain and France to break their special treaty with Japan, and how would you suggest that we should do that? By the exercise of what sort of force?

Japan, as you know, has promised to retain much less than the terms of the treaty give her. She has consented to bind herself by all the engagements of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and if the United States is to be a party to this treaty and a member of the League, she will have an opportunity for serving China in all matters of international justice such as she has never had before, and such as she could not obtain by the course you suggest.²²

This ended Wilson's policy toward Japan. Had the president been interested in changing the Shantung arrangement the opportunity passed. In the early autumn of 1919 Wilson left on his "swing around the circle," curtailed when he became ill. He returned to Washington only to suffer a thrombosis, paralyzing his left side and virtually all of his future presidential activity. Foreign affairs suffered because of lack of leadership. John V. A. MacMurray, chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, wrote that Wilson "has been so exclusively responsible for policies -- particularly in the realm of foreign affairs -- the whole administration has been so much of a one man show -- that his disability has paralyzed the whole executive. One has that queer feeling of a ship at sea with engines stopped."²³

The Japanese eventually came to accept Wilson's tune of "Imperialism
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/15 : LOC-HAK-55-5-4-1 their other terri-

stories. That was too late for Wilson and many Americans. It is hard to overestimate the importance of the decade in Japanese-American relations, the era from 1909 to 1920. By the latter year the whole Far Eastern balance had changed. What remaining Russian power there was in this area after 1905 had disappeared with the revolutions of 1917, not to return until the mid-1920s. Defeat by the Allies had removed Germany from Asia. European concerns during this period overshadowed France's limited interest there. Three powers remained: Britain, Japan, the United States. Compared to their world-wide interests the Far East was not as significant to the British as to the Japanese and Americans. Between these latter two powers the contrast was great. The Japanese seemed to stand for the old diplomacy of imperialism, the Americans (at least in their own minds,) for the new diplomacy of international cooperation. The contrast had turned the fear and respect with which the United States viewed Tokyo to a deep-seated suspicion, mixed with resentment. China had become the major Far Eastern concern of Americans. The Japanese could no longer expect to get rights in China denied in the Eastern Pacific. The moral adoption of China was decisive, the major change in Japanese-American relations between 1909 and 1920.

As the Wilson administration came to a close, it was apparent to both Americans and Japanese that some attempt had to be made to bring a reconsideration of the relations between the two countries. That attempt was symbolized by the Washington Naval Conference, where the leading American diplomat playing the tune of "International Cooperation" was Charles Evans

Hughes.

Hughes had had little background in foreign affairs before taking control of the Department of State in 1921. His formal training consisted of teaching a course on international law during two years at the Cornell University Law School in the early 1890s. But by 1921 he had adopted some views on foreign policy. He seemed to stand in contrast to Wilson by noting that "foreign policies are not built upon abstractions" but resulted from international cooperation which recognized "divergent national ambitions." He believed that war was a continuing feature of international relations and thought the most important task of the diplomat to avoid war. Hughes held little hope for the repression of armed conflict by radical revision of international law. He saw no point -- and here his disagreement with Wilson was clear -- in advocating formulas "which may legally require a state to act against its vital interests." This led him to the "most distinctive" enterprise of his times -- "the development of institutions for the promotion of international arbitration, adjudication, and conciliation, as well as the codification of traditional international law."²⁴ He stressed international law and diplomatic accommodation, while recognizing the existence of power. Hughes believed in progressive development of world order, but realized that development would be slow and that attempts at radical change were bound to fail.

What did all of this mean for Japanese-American relations? Hughes sensed that China had to be placed in the broader context of United States East Asian policy, but was also part of Japanese-American relations. He

was willing to draw back from the Wilson position which had isolated China as a consideration of foreign policy. Hughes lacked any exaggerated sentiment for China, and believed that conditions of peace and economic interdependence would dominate in the 1920s and for the Far East this meant a need for order and stability.²⁵ America and Japan had to promote interests and reconcile differences. The controversies of 1909-1920 -- immigration, naval rivalry, trade, territorial issues, China -- had become too intense.

Hughes attempted this broad resettlement in Japanese-American relations at the Washington Conference and played his tune of "International Cooperation" with vigor. The conference and related agreements stand as the most thorough consideration of the Far Eastern problems that occurred between the United States and Japan before 1941. The agreements of Washington are familiar, only the highpoints need mention. The United States acknowledged Japan's wartime gains in the Pacific, in the Four-Power Treaty. The Nine-Power Treaty dealt with China. While Hughes supported Chinese territorial and administrative integrity, he "undertook no major assault upon those long-standing restrictions on Chinese sovereignty associated with extraterritorial rights and international control of the Chinese tariff."²⁶ Hughes did seek to gain Japan's retreat from Shantung. Shantung lay outside the proceedings of the conference, but Hughes saw the Japanese ambassador and Chinese minister and persuaded their countries to negotiate the issue by themselves during the conference. He took part in the talks, exerting pressure to bring a settlement, even holding the final meeting at his house. A treaty between Japan and China on Shantung was signed

February 4, 1922. Hughes did not gain a Japanese retreat from Manchuria. They were to be entrenched. But the Japanese did make concessions, withdrawing some of the harshest of the Twenty-One Demands. They also agreed to evacuate Siberia and Northern Sakhalin. "Behind the verbal cover of the Washington arrangements, however, there was an actual accommodation to the recent acquisitions of Japan in the Pacific and China and an attempt to secure that new status through international pledge."²⁷ The Four-Power Treaty called only for consultation by the signatories and the Nine-Power Treaty had no enforcement provisions in it.

In some ways the most original part of the Washington Conference was the attempt to solve naval differences, which by 1920 had become a central concern in Japanese-American relations. It was an effort to avoid an arms race, and was based on the maintenance of the military status quo. To be sure the Five-Power Treaty dealt only with capital ships but Hughes hoped this would be a significant beginning, especially when combined with the nonfortification provisions of that treaty. Certainly this agreement was a recognition by the United States of Japanese naval importance in the Pacific.²⁸

Hughes believed that the Washington Conference was a beginning. He saw all the agreements -- the Four-, Five-, and Nine-Power Treaties, the Sino-Japanese Treaty on Shantung, the Japanese-American agreement settling the controversy over the Island of Yap, the Japanese promise to withdraw from Siberia, and the later abrogation of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement -- with their political, economic, and military terms, as significant departures from the increased tension that had grown between Japan and the

United States. The picture that eventually emerged from the Washington initiative was the result of "a procession of gigantic horse trades in which each power sought to buy maximum security at minimum expense. Concessions in one treaty were paid for in others, until the complex process of give and take had been completed."²⁹ Hughes hoped that the nations would add self-restraint and good will on top of the agreements and all would then contribute to a sense of security. He did think that the conference had discovered specific formulas which harmonized the interests of the participating nations.

This approach was a departure from the Wilson view, more realistic in dealing with Japanese-American relations, even if the conference was full of weakness and if powers remained unsatisfied. Two of the countries that held large stakes in East Asia before 1914 -- Germany and Russia -- were not represented. The absence of Russia was most significant, for in the 1920s the new Soviet government pursued its own policy and did all it could to bring the expulsion of the United States, Japan, and Britain from positions of dominance on the Asian mainland. China was also slighted, remaining an object of American, Japanese, and British diplomacy, not an equal participant in that diplomacy. And just as certainly the United States was again asking Japan to change its role in East Asia and to accommodate its foreign policy to another western model -- from imperialism to international cooperation, particularly economic cooperation. The Japanese government approved the Washington system, but as Professor Iriye has so clearly shown in his book, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East,

1921-1931, the Japanese "army and navy supreme headquarters had continued to regard conflict with the United States as likely and made this the basic assumption in their defense policies."³⁰ Such developments were not limited to Japanese planners. American strategists revised their Orange Plan in 1924. While civil leaders in both countries continued to stress international cooperation, military planners prepared for war. In the end, at least in Japan, this separation of military policy from foreign policy had large significance.

With completion of the Washington system, Hughes turned attention to other areas of policy, and in the period from 1922 to 1925 gave much attention to policy that did not involve the Far East.³¹ Relations with Japan remained crisis-oriented and Hughes believed the crisis over. But other issues in the 1920s brought trouble to Hughes's tune of cooperation and by 1931 presented a very different situation. One of these was the problem of immigration, which in 1924 came to a screeching halt as a topic of diplomatic negotiation with passage of the Japanese exclusion act. Despite increased Japanese-American trade, and partially because of fear of Japanese economic might, there was great pressure to prevent any future Japanese immigration. Hughes opposed such legislation, but perhaps contributed to its passage by encouraging the Japanese to express concern. A Japanese note, which forecast possible "grave consequences" was used by exclusionists in their campaign. Hughes wrote Senator Henry Cabot Lodge shortly after Congress acted:

It is a dangerous thing to plant a deep feeling of resentment in

the Japanese people, not that we need to apprehend, much less fear, war, but that we shall have hereafter in the East to count upon a sense of injury and antagonism instead of friendship and cooperation. I dislike to think what the reaping will be after the sowing of this seed.³²

The reaction in Japan was very strong. Some combined it with the Washington Conference. After the 1924 crisis, more and more "the Washington Conference structure of international relations which the civilian government upheld was seen as a white-sponsored system for the perpetuation of Western domination of the world."³³ Many now called for an independent Japanese policy. Another troublesome issue was China, which was so unsettled in the 1920s that cooperation on Chinese questions by the United States and Japan, along with Britain, proved difficult, if not impossible.

The years after Hughes left the State Department saw a movement from cooperation with the Japanese, especially in China. Hughes's successor, Frank B. Kellogg, turned to more unilateral action in regard to China. American sympathies toward China intensified again, especially after 1928.³⁴ China increasingly was becoming a separate issue in Japanese-American relations. Still, it was not until the Manchurian crisis of 1931 that the residue of good feeling from the Washington attempt at new Japanese-American relations was washed away.

The period from 1931 to 1941 has recently been subjected to a good deal of analysis, with a resulting deeper understanding. Among the most important American personalities dominating Japanese-American relations of this era was Henry L. Stimson, secretary of state from 1929 to 1933

and then secretary of war from 1940 to 1945. In contrast to Hughes, Stimson had had some experience in foreign affairs as he entered the State Department. A lawyer by training and a young member of the circle around Theodore Roosevelt, he had served as secretary of war under President Taft, went to Nicaragua in 1927 for President Coolidge, and then became governor general of the Philippines in 1928.³⁵ His legal training was evident in his approach to foreign affairs. In his career in local and national government he had perceived the power of public opinion, and believed that it could be an instrument of diplomacy "to support righteousness in world politics. The decent and aroused feelings of mankind would stand behind an honest diplomacy and perhaps work wonders in world affairs."³⁶ He was representative of the feeling in the United States after the World War that it was possible to use world democratic opinion in support of diplomacy. He believed that nations had to fulfill obligations. Should they stray there was always public opinion. In sum, "Stimson's ideal world was one of ordered and disciplined relations between states according to standards set by a stern Christianity and an Anglo-Saxon sense of proper procedures."³⁷

Stimson came into office with some definite ideas about the Far East, the result of his experience there. He believed the United States had a major interest in East Asia. The position of the United States, he felt, was greatly strengthened by the existence of an outpost in the Philippines, where he thought continued American leadership necessary. Stimson believed "complete independence from the United States was the wrong final goal for the Philippines he considered it impractical and unrealistic; he believed it neither useful for

the Filipinos nor advantageous to the United States." His goal for the Philippines was "self-government under American protection." These views meant major involvement in Asia. He did recognize Japanese rights in the Far East but put limits on them. He opposed any extension of Japanese rights in China, especially in Manchuria. As the Manchurian crisis broke out in 1931, he saw it as an issue "between the Chinese aspiration toward complete national independence and the Japanese conviction that security of basic Japanese interests required the maintenance of extensive economic and political rights in Manchuria."³⁸ From the day he entered office he favored the former. One other point must be made. Stimson came away from the Philippines with certain views about the Oriental mind. His experience had led him to the conclusion that Orientals "had to be faced with firmness, a show of force and a demonstrable willingness to use it."³⁹

It was in 1931 that the relationship between the United States and Japan changed. And in that year Stimson began to play his tune, "Stop the Aggression," which he sounded for the rest of the decade. At the same time, the Japanese began to play their own music as they sought to overcome the effects of the Great Depression and chart their own course in East Asia. The Manchurian crisis that began in September of that year was the beginning of the end of the peaceful relations between the United States and Japan. It brought American attention back to the Far East and renewed sympathy for China. It also symbolized a course of aggression by Japan in East Asia that was a threat to American interests there.

The reasons for the change in Japanese policy in 1931 have been well-

documented.⁴⁰ The economic crisis resulting from the depression, decision by Japanese militarists and nationalists to pursue a new course, resentment against the Western-dominated policy of "International Cooperation," lack of benefits from existing economic relations with China, especially given Chinese efforts to break Japanese dominance in Manchuria, together with Pan-Asian beliefs and many other forces all came together in a war of conquest in Manchuria. From the first Stimson expressed alarm, but considered caution necessary to aid the civil Japanese leaders who were struggling against the militarists who precipitated the crisis. By January, 1932, more than three months after the Japanese began their movement in Manchuria, Stimson was ready to act. He saw the crisis as larger than just Manchuria and believed "that the peace of the Orient was his business, for if a Far Eastern nation broke the peace on a large scale the precedent would not be lost upon Europe, and out of a widening series of international crises would come eventually a crisis in world order."⁴¹ Most of his fellow diplomats saw him as an alarmist.

Stimson had hoped that the matter could be solved by the League of Nations, and even sent a representative to a League Council meeting with instruction to participate in any discussion of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. He had been hopeful when the Japanese consented to a League investigating commission, but wondered if in Japan "the cause of Mr. Hyde against Dr. Jekyll has in large measure been victorious." His fears were confirmed on January 2, 1932, when the Japanese took Chinchow, and he decided the United States had to act unilaterally. On January 7 he asked for nonrecognition,

the same policy used by the United States at the time of the Twenty-One

Demands: The United States

cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, nor to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.⁴²

Stimson's policy had President Hoover's agreement, with both aware of the danger should Japan persist. The Stimson Doctrine, as nonrecognition became known, became part of Japanese-American relations. Reaction was not positive. Britain and France, not consulted before the Doctrine was announced, had other concerns. The Japanese response seemed a full-fledged assault on Shanghai. After diplomatic efforts he determined to state the American position with regard to the Japanese attack upon Shanghai (which had begun at the end of January) and used the device of a public letter to Senator William E. Borah. The letter of February 23, 1932 went beyond the Doctrine of January 7 by indicating that the United States saw the Japanese move a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, that might result in the abrogation of the whole Washington system.⁴³ Stimson was perhaps prepared to go further, with the possible introduction of economic sanctions, but President Hoover and the American people were not. They were interested in too many other things. While Stimson's beliefs were strengthened when the Assembly of the

League, after receiving the report of the Lytton Commission, condemned Japan, the Japanese response was to withdraw from the League.

In the end Stimson's policy failed. Without the resort to economic sanctions or force, there was little that could have been expected. Most Americans condemned Japan but saw little in the interest of the United States that would justify more than condemnation. The Japanese ignored Stimson's opposition, except as a way of gaining domestic support. But Stimson was to have more influence than he might have expected, for his stand attracted some very influential Americans. Most important he found a receptive audience with Hoover's successor in the White House, Franklin D. Roosevelt. With family ties to China and a strong interest in the navy, Roosevelt shared Stimson's concern about Japan. In several conversations he assured Stimson of continuity on the nonrecognition theme. The President-to-be refused at this time to go the sanction route with Stimson, but he also refused to legitimize Japan's change of the status quo in Asia. FDR adopted Stimson's tune of "Stop the Aggression."⁴⁴ While other considerations were to become more important in the 1930s -- naval rivalry, world-wide aggression, Japan's move southward -- Stimson set FDR on the route to a collision with Japan. Throughout the 1930s, China complicated Japanese-American relations. The United States wanted the Japanese to return to the 1920s role in China. Chinese problems "dominated attempts to find a way to avoid war. Traditional China policy had a paralyzing effect on diplomacy."⁴⁵

It was appropriate that Stimson returned to the cabinet in July, 1940,

for by then his policy had gained much acceptance, both within the administration and among the people. Stimson out of office had continued to urge sanctions. In October, 1937, in the wake of Japanese aggression upon China, he appealed for a governmental ban on trade with Japan. But FDR still hoped for peace. By 1940 things were different, and Stimson added his voice to those advocating a hard-line against Japanese moves in the Pacific. His view of the Oriental mind reappeared. He told the British ambassador in August of that year that "to get on with Japan one had to treat her rough, unlike other countries." He told President Roosevelt the same thing, that history had "shown that when the United States indicates by clear language and bold actions that she intends to carry out a clear and affirmative policy in the Far East, Japan will yield to that policy even though it conflicts with her own Asiatic policy and conceived interest."⁴⁶ When the Japanese seemed to become part of a broader threat to America, in the Far East and Europe, the American people and Roosevelt shared his views. The Japanese response came on December 7, 1941.

Was the war inevitable? That is a difficult question about which much has been written. A conference of American and Japanese historians, at Hakone, Japan, July 14-18, 1969, dealt with that question by looking at both the Japanese and American governments. Publication of the proceedings of that conference will be an interesting account of this question.⁴⁷ There were individuals within both governments seeking compromise, and opportunities for peaceful resolution of difficulties that each government missed on the route to Pearl Harbor. The most striking fact to me is the expectation

inevitable. The United States always had hesitated in its disagreements with the Japanese -- war was not worth the interests in dispute. By the late 1930s this feeling had begun to disappear. The 1930s began with a Great Depression but no widespread feeling that war would come. By 1941 feeling had changed.

These four spokesmen represent the changing American views of Japan and the changing roles of the United States and Japan as perceived in Washington. To be sure, Japanese-American relations was not given constant attention. But out of the crisis diplomacy, a change had occurred. In the movement from a view that was a mix of fear and respect, to the view that Japan was an aggressor nation dominated by the military, the relationship had gone sour. In the years between 1898 and 1941, the Japanese had danced to the tunes of TR, Wilson and Hughes, but they would not dance to that played by Stimson. It was ironic that one of the erstwhile members of Theodore Roosevelt's circle should have become the instrumentalist of the new tune. One wonders if the Republican Roosevelt would have liked it.

Notes

1. There are a number of surveys of Japanese-American relations. Most valuable for this study were Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr., eds., American-East Asian Relations: A Survey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), which includes essays by Raymond Esthus, Charles Neu, Burton Beers, Roger Dingman, Akira Iriye, Waldo Heinrichs, and Louis Morton, covering the period from 1901 to 1941; William Neumann, America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1953); Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967); Edwin Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); and three older accounts, by Foster Rhea Dulles, Forty Years of American-Japanese Relations (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1937); A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938); and Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York: (New York: Macmillan, 1922).
2. There is now a good deal of discussion about different phases in Japanese-American relations before 1941. Professor Iriye in his Across the Pacific, and in two other books -- After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) and Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) -- has done the best job of distinguishing the different phases, and his works are essential for anyone interested in that subject.
3. Waldo Heinrichs, "1931-1937," in May and Thomson, eds., American-East Asian Relations, pp. 258-259.
4. This class held a reunion in 1922 in Tokyo, with the American members going on board the U.S.S. Henderson, along with the Secretary of the Navy, Edwin Denby, who though not a member of the class had lived in Asia. For an account of the reunion, see Eugene P. Trani, "Secretary Denby Takes a Trip," Michigan History, LI (1967), 277-297.
5. Akira Iriye's new book, Pacific Estrangement, is an excellent account of the expansionist collision after 1897.
6. There are a number of works dealing with Roosevelt and his view of Japan. Among the best are two works by Raymond Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries (Waltham, Massachusetts: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970) and Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle: University

- of Washington Press, 1946); and books by Charles Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore and Japan, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) and Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956). Shorter attempts to analyze Roosevelt's view on foreign policy, giving some attention to his East Asian policy, are David Healy's excellent "Theodore Roosevelt and the Sturdy Virtues," in his book U.S. Expansionism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970) and Eugene P. Trani, "Theodore Roosevelt," Frank Merli and Theodore Wilson, eds., Makers of American Diplomacy 1775-1975, (forthcoming, 1974, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons).
7. For an account of the role TR played in ending this war, see Eugene P. Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969).
 8. As cited in William Neumann, America Encounters Japan, p. 118. Raymond Esthus's Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries has a good discussion of TR's effort to defuse the issues separating the United States and Japan.
 9. TR to Philander C. Knox, February 8, 1909, in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (8 vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951-1954), VI, pp. 1510-1514.
 10. For a fine discussion of the Japanese decision to move to continental expansion, see Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement.
 11. Ibid., especially pp. 169-201.
 12. Charles Neu, "1906-1913," in May and Thomson, eds., American-East Asian Relations, p. 159.
 13. Woodrow Wilson, History of the American People (5 vols., New York: Harper & Brothers, 1902), V, p. 296, and Newsreport from the Waterbury, Conn. American, December 13, 1900, in Arthur Link, et. al., eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. XII, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 46-48.
 14. William Neumann, America Encounters Japan, pp. 140-141.
 15. Woodrow Wilson to Daniel Coit Gilman, April 13, 1889, in Arthur Link, et. al., eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. VI, (1969), pp. 169-172.
 16. For the Wilson comments about Chinese immigration, see Wilson, History of the American People, V, p. 185. There are a number of accounts of No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/15 : LOC-HAK-55-5-4-1 Bookman

Associates, 1957); Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913-1917 (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1952); and Russell H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East: The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952). The best treatment of Wilson's attitudes toward diplomacy is Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), which should, of course, be supplemented with Professor Link's definitive biography of Wilson, now completed to 1917.

17. Woodrow Wilson to Edward C. Jenkins, March 17, 1913, Woodrow Wilson MSS, Library of Congress. For an analysis of the influence of missionaries on Wilson's China policy, see Eugene P. Trani, "Woodrow Wilson, China, and the Missionaries, 1913-1921," Journal of Presbyterian History, XLIX, (1971), 328-351.
18. William Neumann, America Encounters Japan, p. 136.
19. Burton Beers, "1913-1917," May and Thomson, eds., American-East Asian Relations, p. 183. Beers has written a fine study, Vain Endeavor: Robert Lansing's Attempts to End the American-Japanese Rivalry (Durham: Duke University Press, 1962).
20. Roger Dingman, "1917-1922," May and Thomson, eds., American-East Asian Relations, p. 199.
21. See Russell Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East for a treatment of the Shantung issue at the Paris Conference.
22. Wilson to S. I. Woodbridge, September 2, 1919, J.S. Woodbridge Collection, copy in Princeton University Library.
23. John V.A. MacMurray to Roland Morris, February 7, 1920, Roland Morris MSS, Library of Congress.
24. Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence: A Study in American Diplomacy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp. 153-162 and pp. 281-303. Two other studies of Hughes are Merlo Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (2 vols., New York: Macmillan, 1951); and Dexter Perkins, Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic Statesmanship (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956).
25. Akira Iriye, After Imperialism, pp. 1-20. Professor Iriye develops this model of "International Cooperation" very ably in After Imperialism, and is especially helpful on Japanese reaction.
26. Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence, p. 287 and p. 292.
27. Ibid

28. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Towards a New Order of Seapower (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943).
29. L. Ethan Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy: 1921-1933 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1968), p. 127. Another recent treatment of the Washington Conference is Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970).
30. Akira Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 36. This study is excellent on the different reactions in Japan to the Washington system.
31. Hughes spent, for example, much time on Latin America after 1922. A brief survey of his efforts there is Eugene P. Trani, "Charles Evans Hughes: The First Good Neighbor", Northwest Ohio Quarterly, XL (1968), 138-152.
32. As cited in Akira Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 35. See also William Neumann, America Encounters Japan, pp. 176-177.
33. Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific, p. 153.
34. For a treatment of Kellogg's policy, see Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York: Octagon Books, 1968).
35. There are a number of treatments of Stimson. Among the most helpful is Robert H. Ferrell, Frank B. Kellogg-Henry L. Stimson (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1963).
36. Ibid., p. 164.
37. William Neumann, America Encounters Japan, p. 191.
38. McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service In Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 146-150 and p. 221.
39. William Neumann, America Encounters Japan, p. 191.
40. See Akira Iriye, "1922-1931," and Waldo Heinrichs, "1931-1937," May and Thomson, eds., American-East Asian Relations, for bibliography on this subject.
41. Robert H. Ferrell, Frank B. Kellogg-Henry L. Stimson, p. 219. The best single account of the Manchurian Crisis is Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). See also Armin Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931-1933 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) and Richard Current, Secretary

Stimson: A Study in Statecraft (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954).

42. As cited in Robert Ferrell, Frank B. Kellogg-Henry L. Stimson, p. 235, and pp. 238-239.
43. Ibid, pp. 253-255.
44. For an account of FDR's relations with Stimson, see William Neumann, America Encounters Japan, pp. 199-201 and pp. 263-265.
45. Waldo Heinrichs, "The Griswold Theory of Our Far Eastern Policy: A Commentary," Dorothy Borg, comp., Historians and American Far Eastern Policy (New York: Columbia University East Asian Institute, 1966), p. 41.
46. As cited in William Neumann, American Encounters Japan, pp. 263-265.
47. This volume, due out in the late spring, 1973, is to be published by the Columbia University Press. An excellent survey of the last complicated few years before the war is Louis Morton, "1937-1941," May and Thomson, eds., American-East Asian Relations.

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